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Introduction
The COVID-19 (Coronavirus Disease-19) is the most urgent health 
emergency worldwide and all professionals are called to give support in 
the diagnosis and treatment of patients affected by this disease.
The Scientific Society of Hospital Legal Medicine of the National Health 
System (COMLAS) and the Italian Society of Anatomical Pathology and 
Cytology (SIAPEC) produced this document with the intent of offering a 
technical support to professional involved in the autoptic activities during 
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the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavi-
rus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) epidemic infection.
Coronaviruses are a broad category of viruses known 
to cause diseases ranging from the common cold to 
Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) and 
Acute Severe Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). Recent-
ly, a novel coronavirus (nCoV) was identified that had 
never previously been found in humans 1-3.
The viruses responsible for SARS include SARS-
CoV-2 (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coro-
navirus 2); the disease caused by the new Corona-
virus is called COVID-19 (Coronavirus Disease-19) 
and represents a cluster of pneumonia that has spread 
to China and other countries of the world since 31 De-
cember 2019 4-8.
Initial reports suggest that transmission occurs during 
close contact with an infected subject, mainly through 
respiratory droplets produced in the act of speaking, 
coughing or sneezing 9,10. Droplets can settle on the 
eyes, nose or mouth, as well as being inhaled by peo-
ple nearby. At present, long-distance aerial transmis-
sion from person to person is unlikely.
Common signs of infection include fever, cough and 
breathing difficulties. In severe cases, the infection 
can cause pneumonia, severe acute respiratory 
syndrome, multi-organ dysfunction or failure, and 
death 11-16.
WHO, CDC and ECDC have provided clear details on 
measures to prevent the spread of the virus 17-21. Stan-
dard recommendations to prevent the spread of infec-
tion include regular hand washing, covering the mouth 
and nose when coughing or sneezing and avoiding 
close contact 22,23.
At the Italian national level, the extra- and intra-hos-
pital path of suspect or confirmed cases of COVID-19 
and the indications relating to the use of personal pro-
tective equipment (PPE) by healthcare personnel are 
extensively defined 24-28.
In view of the limited scientific knowledge and evi-
dence on SARS-CoV-2 infection, it is therefore con-
sidered appropriate to proceed systematically with the 
management of COVID-19 cases  29,30, whether they 
are suspect, probable or confirmed, accepted at the 
morgue. Hence the need to condense the available 
evidence on biological risk, individual protection and 
autopsy investigation with the aim of providing a prac-
tical guidance.
The recommendations expressed in this document 
have been developed to help healthcare profession-
als and morgue staff manage COVID-19 deaths by 
advising on possible risks and preventive measures. 
In the same way, indications will be provided about 
the post-mortem investigation of suspect, probable or 
confirmed cases of COVID-19.
Purpose and field of application
The classification of infectious hazards needs to be 
periodically reviewed and updated in light of global ep-
idemiological trends. The categorization of infectious 
biological agents provides for the attribution to hazard 
groups (Hazard Group 1-4) based on the probability of 
causing disease in humans, the probability of spread-
ing the infection in the community, the availability of 
prophylactic or therapeutic measures 31.
The Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens 
(ACDP) in early 2020 established a provisional clas-
sification of SARS-CoV-2 as an HG3 pathogen (Hazard 
Group 3). In this regard, it should be emphasized that 
HG3 agents can cause serious diseases in humans 
and constitute a serious risk for professionals; the agent 
may spread in the community, but effective prophylac-
tic or therapeutic measures are usually available. The 
risks for personnel operating in the morgue facilities, in 
most infections, are minimal when standard universal 
precautions for infection prevention are applied 32-35.
The purpose of the operating procedure is, therefore, 
to indicate how to manage the bodies of suspect or 
confirmed cases of COVID-19 in order to minimize the 
risk of environmental contamination and the contagion 
of personnel involved in the process. According to this 
perspective, the document is intended to recommend:
• the preparation of standard operating procedures 
(SOP) for the containment of infectious risk;
• adequate conduct for carrying out activities and 
maneuvers at risk during autopsy checks on cases 
of SARS-CoV-2 infection;
• personal protective equipment (PPE) to be used in 
daily practice;
• the optimal evaluation pathways for the diagnosis 
of SARS-CoV-2 infection.
The present document is mainly aimed at staff serv-
ing in morgues (health professionals, trainees, as 
well as auxiliary, administrative and surveillance staff) 
and must be applied to every death from COVID-19, 
whether suspect, probable or confirmed.
Terms and definitions
COVID-19 Case DefInItIOn
The case definition is based on the information cur-
rently available and can be updated based on the evo-
lution of the epidemiological situation and the scien-
tific knowledge available 36. 
The Circular issued by the Italian Ministry of Health on 
09.03.2020 provides - in updating and replacement of 
the previous ones - the definition of suspect, probable 
and confirmed case 37.
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Suspect case
Laboratory investigations for COVID-19 should be 
performed for suspect cases according to the follow-
ing criteria, based on the updated WHO and ECDC 
definitions:
• patient with acute respiratory tract infection (sud-
den onset of at least one symptom between fever, 
cough, and dyspnoea) with no other etiology that 
fully explains the clinical presentation and with a 
history of travel or residence in a country or area 
that has reported local transmission or community 
in the 14 days preceding the onset of symptoms 
(consult the WHO reports on the situation; www.
who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavi-
rus-2019/situation-reports/), or;
• patient with any acute respiratory infection who 
has been in close contact with a probable or con-
firmed case of SARS-CoV-2 infection in the last 14 
days before the onset of symptoms, or;
• patient with a severe acute respiratory infection (fever 
and at least one symptom or sign of respiratory dis-
eases such as coughing and difficulty breathing) who 
requires hospitalization (SARI), with no other etiology 
that fully explains the clinical presentation, or;
• in the context of primary care or in the hospital 
emergency room, all patients with symptoms of 
acute respiratory infection must be considered 
suspect cases if the local transmission has been 
reported in that area or in the country.
Any positivity found for common respiratory patho-
gens may not exclude co-infection with SARS-CoV-2 
and therefore samples must be tested for this virus 
anyway.
Probable case
Suspect case for which the result of the test carried 
out at the Reference Laboratories using specific Real 
Time PCR protocols for SARS-CoV-2 is doubtful or 
not conclusive, or, for which a positivity to the pan-
coronavirus test is confirmed.
Confirmed case
Case with ascertained positivity for SARS-CoV-2 in-
fection, regardless of the presence of clinical signs 
and symptoms.
DefInItIOn Of ClOse COntaCt
Close contact with a probable or confirmed case is 
defined as:
• person living with a case of COVID-19;
• subject who had physical contact with a COVID-19 
case (e.g. handshake);
• subject who had unprotected direct contact with 
secretions from a COVID-19 case;
• subject who had direct contact with a COVID-19 
case at a distance of less than 2 meters and for a 
time greater than 15 minutes;
• subject who has been in a closed environment 
(e.g. classroom, meeting room, waiting room, etc.) 
with a COVID-19 case for more than 15 minutes 
and at a distance of less than 2 meters;
• healthcare professionals or other subjects provid-
ing direct assistance for a COVID-19 case, or labo-
ratory operator handling specimens of a COVID-19 
case without the recommended personal protec-
tive equipment (PPE);
• aircraft contact with a case of COVID-19 sitting in 
the same row or in the two preceding or subse-
quent rows, traveling companions or assisting per-
sons and crew members serving in the section of 
the aircraft where the case was housed (if the case 
manifests serious symptoms or has made move-
ments inside the aircraft, the passengers seated 
in the whole section or all the passengers of the 
aircraft can be considered close contacts).
The epidemiological link can be established if contact 
is documented between the suspect case under con-
sideration and a confirmed case within a period of 14 
days before the onset of symptoms.
Hygiene precautions in the management 
of suspect, probable or confirmed case 
of COVID-19 
In compliance with scientific evidence and the provi-
sions of the Italian Ministry of Health, all health pro-
fessionals involved in the management of suspect or 
documented cases of COVID-19 are required to adopt, 
in addition to standard safety measures, the necessary 
precautions to prevent the transmission of the virus 38,39.
HanD HygIene
Carry out antiseptic hand washing with alcoholic solu-
tion or antiseptic soap and water after each contact 
with the body.
The antiseptic hand washing technique must comply 
with the WHO sequence  40,41. Failure to comply with 
proper hand hygiene negates the protective efficacy 
of personal protective equipment.
COntaCt preCautIOns
In addition to the standard precautions, anyone who 
comes into contact with a suspect case of COVID-19 
must strictly adhere to the contact precautions.
Is essential:
• to pay close attention to avoid accidentally touch-
ing with the face (eyes, nose, and mouth);
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• to minimize the number of people present at the 
same time in the area where the body is allocat-
ed;
• to always close the door of the room where the 
body is located and keep the openings to a min-
imum.
InDIVIDual prOteCtIOn measures
PPE offers the highest possible protection against 
HG3 infectious agents. The morgue staff must use the 
following PPE in the coded manner for the different 
operational phases of body management (accept-
ance, custody, handling and autopsy) (Tab. I):
• disposable headgear;
• double pair of disposable gloves;
• cut-resistant protective gloves;
• respiratory filter FFP2 or FFP3 (the latter recom-
mended in the procedures that produce aerosols) 
and face protection (goggles or protective visor);
• disposable long-sleeved gown or waterproof suit;
• disposable overshoes.
DressIng prOCeDure
It must take place in the filter area according to the 
following steps:
1 Remove all jewelry
2 Check the integrity of the personal protective 
equipment
3 Put on the disposable headgear and overshoes
4 Put on the first pair of disposable gloves
5 Wear the disposable gown, fastening it on the neck 
and hips, or the waterproof suit
6 Wear FFP2 facial filter (FFP3 filter in case of pro-
cedures that produce aerosols)
7 Wear protective goggles and/or visor
8 Put on the second pair of disposable gloves
The main stages of the dressing procedure are sum-
marized below on the basis of the recommendations 
of the CDC on the correct use of personal protective 
equipment 42.
Correct use of the facial filter
1 Check the integrity of the device
2 Open the ends of the lower flaps of the mask, mak-
ing sure that the valve (FFP3) is correctly oriented 
3 Turn the mask upside down allowing the elastics 
to come out
4 Slightly bend the upper part of the mask forming a 
“V” to favor a better dressing
5 Remove the adhesive tab (if present)
6 Put on the mask by adjusting the elastic bands 
with both hands
7 First place the upper elastic in the middle of the 
back surface of the head, then the lower elastic on 
the nape
8 Place the mask under the chin and shape the up-
per part to allow adequate adherence to the face
9 Perform the mask tightness test. Cover the facial 
filter with both hands and perform an inhalation or 
exhalation test, as described below:
Table I. Specific risks and recommended PPE for the different operational phases of body management.
Phase Risks PPE
Admission and Handling  - Contact with potentially infected material 
from corpses
 - Disposable gloves (single pair)
 - Respiratory filter FFP2
 - Goggles or protective visor
 - Disposable long-sleeved gown or waterproof suit
 - Disposable overshoes
Swab collection  - Contact with potentially infected material 
from corpses
 - Disposable gloves (single pair)
 - Respiratory filter FFP2
 - Goggles or protective visor
 - Disposable long-sleeved gown or waterproof suit
 - Disposable overshoes
Autopsy investigation  - Contact with potentially infected material 
from corpses
 - Sharp injuries
 - Production of splashes and aerosols
 - Disposable headgear
 - Disposable gloves (double pair)
 - Cut-resistant protective gloves
 - Respiratory filter FFP3 
 - Goggles or protective visor
 - Disposable long-sleeved gown or waterproof suit
 - Disposable overshoes
Environmental disinfection  - Contact with potentially infected material 
from corpses
 - Production of splashes and aerosols
 - Disposable gloves
 - Respiratory filter FFP3
 - Goggles or protective visor
 - Disposable long-sleeved gown or waterproof suit
 - Disposable overshoes
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 - perform a deep inhalation; if the mask collaps-
es slightly, the tightness is adequate; if air is 
perceived from the edges of the mask, better 
adjust the position and length of the elastics; 
if an air leak is felt around the nose, correctly 
position the upper support, the patch, and the 
nose clip;
 - perform a forced exhalation; if there is no air 
leak, the mask is properly sealed.
unDressIng prOCeDure
At the end of the procedures, in the filter areas, it is 
essential:
• avoid touching any surface before carrying out the 
undressing procedure;
• avoid any contact between potentially contaminat-
ed PPE and the face, mucous membranes or skin.
The undressing procedure must take place in the filter 
area, taking care to avoid self-contamination, respect-
ing the following sequence:
1 Remove the disposable gown and the overshoes 
by disposing of them in the special container
2 Remove the first pair of gloves and dispose of it in 
the special container
3 Remove the protective glasses and sanitize them
4 Remove the facial filter, taking care not to touch 
the front surface of the mask (remove it from the 
elastics with back-forward movement) and dispose 
of it in the appropriate container
5 Remove the headgear
6 Remove the second pair of gloves and dispose of 
it in the special container
7 Perform antiseptic hand washing
The main stages of undressing are illustrated below 
in two different sequences, in accordance with the 
recommendations of the CDC on the correct use of 
personal protective equipment 42.
Before leaving the autopsy rooms, carefully remove 
the PPE to avoid contamination and dispose of it in 
the appropriate containers.
Any reusable PPE (goggles, visors, respirators, etc.) 
must be properly cleaned, decontaminated and kept 
in view of subsequent use.
After the undressing procedure, scrub the hands with 
soap and water for at least 20 seconds. If the hands 
are not visibly dirty and there is no running water 
available, an alcoholic solution with a concentration of 
60-95% can be used. However, in the event that the 
hands are visibly dirty, always scrub with soap and 
water before using any type of disinfectant.
Avoid contact of face, mouth, and eyes with gloved or 
unwashed hands 43. 
Ensure the availability of hand hygiene devices in the 
immediate vicinity of the PPE removal area.
Operating procedures
OperatIng prOCeDure fOr tHe management Of tHe 
COrpse wItH suspeCt, prObable Or COnfIrmeD DIagnOsIs 
Of COVID-19
The proposed procedure is aimed at the safe manage-
ment of the phases of acceptance, handling, custody, 
and discharge of the body with suspect, probable or 
confirmed diagnosis of COVID-19 44-47. The objective 
has been pursued by drawing up the following recom-
mendations:
• the acceptance and handling of the body must be 
done by personnel equipped with the recommend-
ed PPE;
• the body must be positioned on a sanitized metal 
stretcher for custody and subsequent investiga-
tions;
• at the end of the investigations, the body must be 
placed in the coffin with the clothes and wrapped in 
a sheet soaked in disinfectant solution;
• if the stay of the corpse in the morgue is neces-
sary - pending or at the conclusion of the investiga-
tions - the same must take place inside a special 
closed body bag and dedicated refrigerated room;
• at the end of the handling and transport opera-
tions, all the equipment used must be subjected 
to sanitization.
reCOmmenDatIOns fOr autOpsy InVestIgatIOn In Cases Of 
suspeCt, prObable Or COnfIrmeD COVID-19
For the safe and effective performance of HG3 (Hazard 
Group 3) autopsy investigations, is required (Fig. 1):
• generic risk assessment and adoption of universal 
standard precautions;
• knowledge of possible pathological findings that 
can be highlighted;
• the definition of SOP (Standard Operating Proce-
dures) for the management of autopsies with high 
biological risk.
The use of universal precautions effectively protects 
against most risks related to SARS-CoV-2 infection. 
Professionals have a duty to carry out risk assess-
ment for each case in order to prevent actions that 
could put operators at risk.
Pre-autoptic risk assessment should include:
• anamnestic information collected from close rela-
tives or acquaintances;
• information from family physicians;
• information obtained from healthcare facilities.
Information on the circumstances of the death is es-
sential. In addition to information on the state of health 
and the place of death, knowledge of any previous 
national and international trips, as well as laboratory 
data (positive and negative), is fundamental. It is im-
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Figure 1. Diagnostic algorithm for medico-legal autopsies.
MANAGEMENT OF THE CORPSE WITH SUSPECT, PROBABLE OR CONFIRMED COVID-19 RESPIRATORY INFECTION 7
portant not to assume that the information acquired is 
accurate.
The criteria for the preliminary assessment of deaths 
and the definition of any cases are the same as those 
used to evaluate the possible risk of infection in living 
patients.
If after the preliminary assessment it is believed that 
a death may be due to COVID-19, the subsequent in-
vestigations must be oriented towards confirmation of 
the diagnosis and the precise definition of the role of 
the SARS-CoV-2 infection in the determinism of death 
(study of any pre-existing conditions and comorbidi-
ties capable of characterizing a condition of fragility 
of the subject). Judicial autopsies are an exception as 
any diagnostic activity depends on the prior consent 
of the Prosecutor.
For suspected or probable HG3 infection, preliminary 
nasopharyngeal and oropharyngeal swabs are rec-
ommended for diagnostic confirmation. In the event 
of a positive swab, especially if there is clinical, labo-
ratory and radiological confirmation, the execution of 
the autopsy investigation is discretionary. In cases of 
swab positivity in which there is no clinical or radio-
logical confirmation of the diagnosis, the study using 
post-mortem computed tomography (PMCT) is rec-
ommended in accordance with the availability and the 
care loads on the hospital structure; if a post-mortem 
radiological study is not possible, an autopsy should 
be performed. If the swab is negative, the autopsy is 
mandatory.
The autopsy must concern all the body districts and 
be oriented towards the search for significant findings 
for diagnosis 48-50. For this purpose, en bloc extraction 
of the cervical and thoracic organs is recommended in 
order to adequately define the respiratory pathological 
manifestations and facilitate sampling operations.
In general, the following measures are recommended 
for the safety of autopsy practice:
• mantain all the necessary equipment on hand to 
avoid leaving the autopsy area to find additional 
items;
• in order to prevent accidents, limit the phases in 
which the intervention of multiple operators is fore-
seen and privilege the activity of expert operators;
• use PM40 scissors or blades with blunt tips, in or-
der to reduce the risk of injury;
• minimize the presence of cutting edges in the work 
area; their position must be known to all operators 
at all times;
• cut the organs not fixed in formalin keeping them 
still on the table and using a sponge, paying atten-
tion to protect the hands;
• use the oscillating saw with aspiration of the bone 
aerosol for the opening of the cranial cavity; in 
case of unavailability use a hand saw wearing met-
al mesh gloves;
• avoid incongruous maneuvers for the disposal of 
needles after sampling; needle and syringe must 
be placed in the appropriate container for cutting 
edges;
• maintain adequate water pressure to avoid splash-
ing;
• clothing worn by the corpse must be disposed of 
as contaminated special waste;
• prepare a register to record the specific activities 
carried out (cadaveric inspection, autoptic assess-
ment, collection of samples, etc.), the date of per-
formance of the same, as well as the names of the 
operators directly involved and of the staff present 
in the morgue structure during the activity.
The team performing an autopsy at high infectious 
risk should ideally include an operating forensic pa-
thologist/pathologist, a “clean” assistant forensic pa-
thologist/pathologist and a technician. The assistant 
forensic pathologist/pathologist performs auxiliary 
tasks such as sample management. 
Residents should be involved in autoptic activity only 
under the supervision of senior staff, but especially 
when they have demonstrated knowledge of the risks, 
awareness of the protective measures and proven ex-
perience in autopsy practice  51,52; briefly, as regards 
HG3 cases, the Authors’ recommendation is to limit 
the involvement of residents in the most risky proce-
dures such as evisceration.
From a structural point of view, performing HG3 autop-
sies requires effective ventilation in the autopsy room 
and the possibility to maintain an adequate distance 
in carrying out the different activities 53. 
In accordance with the CDC indications, autopsies in 
cases of suspect or confirmed COVID-19 are always 
practicable as long as the conditions of maximum 
safety and infectious disease protection for operators 
and work environments can be guaranteed.
In particular, the CDC reports that “Autopsies on de-
cedents with known or suspected COVID-19 should 
be conducted in Airborne Infection Isolation Rooms 
(AIIRs). These rooms are at negative pressure to sur-
rounding areas, have a minimum of 6 air changes 
per hour (ACH) for existing structures and 12 ACH for 
renovated or new structures, and have air exhausted 
directly outside or through a HEPA filter. Doors to the 
room should be kept closed except during entry and 
egress. If an AIIR is not available, ensure the room is 
negative pressure with no air recirculation to adjacent 
spaces. 
A portable HEPA recirculation unit could be placed in 
the room to provide further reduction in aerosols. Lo-
cal airflow control (i.e., laminar flow systems) can be 
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used to direct aerosols away from personnel. If use of 
an AIIR or HEPA unit is not possible, the procedure 
should be performed in the most protective environ-
ment possible. Air should never be returned to the 
building interior, but should be exhausted outdoors, 
away from areas of human traffic or gathering spaces 
and away from other air intake systems” 54-55.
Recommendations for the safe collection and 
transport of samples
The present document provides specific guidance for 
the collection and management of cadaveric speci-
mens for the diagnostic in-depth of COVID-19. Simi-
larly, recommendations are made for biosafety and 
infection control during specimen collection and han-
dling 55,56.
In cases where an autopsy is performed, the collection 
of the following samples for SARS-CoV-2 research is 
recommended:
• upper respiratory tract swabs (nasopharyngeal 
swab and oropharyngeal swab);
• swabs of the lower respiratory tract (from each lung);
• organ and tissue samples to be kept in formalin for 
subsequent histopathological investigations.
If the investigation ends with the cadaveric inspection, 
only the collection of swabs from the upper respiratory 
tract is recommended.
It is important to keep the SARS-CoV-2 samples sep-
arate from the samples taken for other microbiological 
and non-microbiological investigations.
The presence of health professionals in autopsy 
rooms should be limited to operators engaged in sam-
pling. Since the collection of cadaveric samples does 
not induce coughing or sneezing, a negative pressure 
environment is not required.
Personnel must comply with the standard precautions 
previously described.
Use only synthetic fiber swabs with plastic rods; differ-
ent devices with wooden barrels or with calcium algi-
nate can inactivate the viral agent and make the PCR 
test ineffective 57,58.
For the proper collection of a nasopharyngeal swab:
1 insert a swab into the nostril parallel to the palate;
2 leave the swab in place for a few seconds to ab-
sorb secretions;
3 perform a contralateral swab in the same way and 
with the same device.
Proper carrying out of the oropharyngeal swab re-
quires:
1 insertion of the device into the oral cavity until it 
reaches the posterior pharyngeal wall (attention to 
avoid contact with the tongue);
2 leave the swab in place for a few seconds to ab-
sorb secretions.
To perform an adequate lower respiratory tract swab:
1 insert the swab into the branches of the main bron-
chus;
2 leave the swab in place for a few seconds to ab-
sorb secretions;
3 perform a contralateral swab in the same way but 
with a different device.
Immediately after the procedure, place each of the 
swabs in a different sterile tube containing 2-3 ml of 
transport medium for subsequent storage in the re-
frigerator at 2-8°C before processing. Each container 
must be labeled indicating the identification number of 
the subject, the identification code of the sample, the 
type of sample and the date of collection of the same.
Safe preparation of specimens for transport involves:
1 insertion of sterile tubes containing the swabs into 
a secondary container;
2 placing the containers inside a sealable clean 
plastic bag;
3 if possible, the insertion of the sealable bag in an 
additional bag for biological samples;
4 transfer outside the autopsy area and delivery to 
an operator equipped with disposable nitrile gloves 
for transport.
Regarding the sampling of organs for formalin fixa-
tion 59,60, the collection of tissue samples with a size 
of 4-5 mm thickness is recommended. The volume of 
formalin used for fixation should be 3 times greater 
than the volume of the tissues. Use 10% buffered 
formalin for at least 48 hours to achieve optimal fixa-
tion. With respect to standard samples for histological 
investigations, particular care must be taken with a 
sampling of the trachea (proximal and distal) and lung 
(the hilar region with segmental and primary bronchi, 
as well as parenchyma representative of all the lobes 
of both lungs).
This sampling method finds its rationale in the viral 
tropism for the epithelia of the upper respiratory tract 
(in particular primary airways and segmental bronchi) 
which for this reason exhibit greater performance in 
molecular tests and immunohistochemical investiga-
tions 61,62.
Further sampling should be guided by the anamnesis, 
as well as by the autopsy findings and may include, 
for example, samples for bacteriological culture tests 
or toxicological investigations.
pOst-prOCeDural prOpHylaCtIC rules anD 
enVIrOnmental DIsInfeCtIOn
Below are the general guidelines for cleaning and 
disposal of waste following a necropsy investigation 
of a suspect or confirmed case of COVID-19  63,64; it 
should be noted that at present the persistence time 
of SARS-CoV-2 on surfaces is uncertain 65,66.
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At the end of the autopsy investigations, the body 
must be positioned in a body bag and transported 
in a refrigerated room. Disinfect the outside of the 
body bag with a hospital disinfectant applied accord-
ing to the manufacturer’s recommendations. It is also 
recommended in this phase the use of suitable PPE 
by each operator involved in the movement and exit 
phases of the body.
In addition, following an autopsy on a subject with 
suspect or confirmed COVID-19, the following recom-
mendations for disinfection of autopsy rooms should 
be applied:
• keep ventilation systems active during cleaning;
• wear disposable gloves when cleaning and han-
dling cleaning or disinfectant solutions;
• dispose of gloves after cleaning; do not wash or 
reuse the gloves in any case;
• use eye protection, such as a visor or goggles, if 
splashing is expected;
• if necessary, use respiratory protection based on 
the type of detergent or disinfectant;
• wear a long-sleeved waterproof device to protect 
skin and clothing;
• use disinfectants with indications of efficacy 
against human coronaviruses;
• clean the surfaces and apply the disinfectant en-
suring an adequate contact time for effective dis-
infection;
• comply with the safety precautions and warnings 
indicated on the product label (for example, allow 
adequate ventilation in restricted areas and ensure 
correct disposal of the unused product or used 
containers);
• avoid product application methods that cause the 
production of splashes or aerosols.
Regarding environmental disinfection, the available 
evidence has shown that coronaviruses are effectively 
inactivated by adequate sanitization procedures that 
include the use of common hospital disinfectants, 
such as sodium hypochlorite (0.1-0.5%), ethanol (62-
71%) or hydrogen peroxide (0.5%). There is currently 
no evidence to support a greater environmental sur-
vival or a lower sensitivity of SARS-CoV-2 to the afore-
mentioned disinfectants 67.
Hard and non-porous surfaces can be cleaned and 
disinfected as previously described.
Handle with gloves and disinfect properly after use, 
equipment such as cameras, telephones and key-
boards, as well as all objects that remain in the au-
topsy room.
Cleaning activities must be supervised and periodical-
ly checked to ensure that correct procedures are fol-
lowed. Sanitation personnel must be properly trained 
and equipped with suitable PPE.
After cleaning and removing the PPE, wash the hands 
immediately. Avoid touching the face with gloved or 
unwashed hands.
Environmental disinfection must include cleaning with 
water and detergent soap on all vertical and horizontal 
surfaces, followed by disinfection with hospital disin-
fectants effective against SARS-CoV-2.
For environmental decontamination, it is necessary 
to use dedicated or disposable equipment. Reusable 
equipment must be decontaminated after use with a 
chlorine-based disinfectant. The use of special trolleys 
is strongly recommended, different from those used 
for cleaning common areas.
The instruments used for autopsies should be auto-
claved or treated through chemical sterilizers.
management Of aCCess anD mOVement Of VIsItOrs wItHIn 
tHe faCIlIty
Conclusively, it is necessary to formulate recommen-
dations regarding the management of access and 
movement of visitors within the morgue area. Specifi-
cally, it is essential to establish procedures for moni-
toring, managing and informing all visitors:
• educate visitors on the usefulness of hand hygiene 
and standard precautions, especially in common 
areas;
• invite visitors to stay in the facility for the time strict-
ly necessary, avoiding stops and movements in 
non-essential areas;
• inform visitors about the appropriate use of PPE 
according to local policies for access and circula-
tion in the facility;
• actively evaluate all visitors for fever and respira-
tory symptoms at the entrance; if present, visitors 
should not be allowed access to the facility;
• limit access points;
• encourage the use of alternative mechanisms for 
interactions with administrative offices;
• schedule the discharge of the dead bodies in order 
to avoid the coincidence of multiple exits;
• install physical barriers in the access and reception 
areas to limit close contact with visitors;
• allow access to administrative rooms and exhibi-
tion halls in the manner imposed by their size and 
turnout with the aim of avoiding gatherings and 
allowing compliance with the interpersonal safety 
distance of at least one meter;
• limit access to funeral services, allowing them to 
stay for the time strictly necessary for administra-
tive needs as well as for the preparation and trans-
port of the body;
• allow access to the ministers of worship for the 
time strictly necessary for the blessing of the body; 
suspend any further ceremonial rite.
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Autopsy of inpatient subjects 
Most of the autopsies performed by the pathologists 
are requested by clinicians with the aim to clarify or 
confirm the causes of death of inpatients subjects. By 
correlating clinical data with morpho-histological alter-
ations of different organs and tissues the pathologists 
draw the epicrisis.
In the case of death for SARS-COV-2 the forefront di-
agnosis of the infection is based on the detection of 
the virus on nasal and oropharyngeal swabs with PCR 
technique. Lung involvement is paramount in SARS-
CoV-2 infections and Computerized Tomography (CT) 
is the routine imaging modality to diagnose and moni-
tor patients with SARS-COV-2 pneumonia 68. CT may 
assist in the early diagnosis of lung alterations typi-
cal of SARS-COV-2 during screening of patients with 
highly suspicious conditions, in particular patients 
with an initial negative RT-PCR screening result  69. 
The histopathological pattern of early SARS-COV-2 
infection in the lung has been described 14 as an in-
cidental finding on specimens obtained from patients 
operated for lung cancer, for whom the infection was 
not diagnosed at the time of surgery. The histological 
finding of advanced infection phase was reported on 
biopsy samples obtained from lung, liver and heart 15. 
The pathological characteristics of COVID-19 closely 
resemble those observed in SARS coronavirus and 
Middle Eastern respiratory syndrome (MERS) 16,70.
The above reported data suggest that in SARS-COV-2 
infection the histological examination does not have 
a diagnostic role in the first instance but confirms the 
result of the laboratory test and of imaging.
autOpsy Of subjeCts wItH, suspeCt, prObable Or 
COnfIrmeD sars-COV-2 InfeCtIOn
If an autopsy of inpatient subjects with, suspect, prob-
able or confirmed SARS-COV-2 infection is requested 
to diagnose the death causes, the procedure must 
be performed by the pathologists following the above 
reported operating procedures, including the proce-
dure to collect tissue specimens (Fig. 2).
If the collection of tissue samples on the corpse of a 
subject with a full picture of infection or suspect of be-
ing infected with SARS-COV-2 is considered essential 
for the disease diagnosis, an option is also to col-
lect specimens from multiple organs (lung, liver, skel-
etal muscle) using core biopsy sampling, albeit with 
the limits of such procedures performed on cadaver 
(Fig. 2). The specimens must be immediately fixed in 
buffered formalin for no less than 48 hours. 
The post-mortem biopsy sample collection must be: 
(a) requested on the advice of a multidisciplinary team 
that includes at least one clinician and one radiolo-
gist; (b) agreed with the reference pathologist; (c) the 
request must report patient personal data; outcome 
of swabs for COVID-19; clinical /anamnestic data and 
imaging report.
In the case of specific research protocols that require 
molecular or immunohistochemical analyses for which 
it is necessary to proceed with the collection of sam-
ples taken and stored in ways other than those indi-
cated (for example, fresh or frozen samples) it is man-
datory to agree with the regional reference center that 
will take care of the procedures for collecting, storing 
and transporting the material.
autOpsy frOm patIents wItHOut apparent sars-COV-2 
InfeCtIOn anD fOr ClInICal reasOns InDepenDent Of 
pulmOnary prOblems anD/Or COmplICatIOns
In the event that a diagnostic autopsy is required for 
clinical reasons independent of lung pathology and/or 
complications in subjects who apparently do not have 
SARS-CoV-2 infection, it is recommended:
• to discuss with the clinicians the clinical and imag-
ing findings and the reason why the postmortem 
examination is requested;
• to perfom within 2 hours of death an oropharynge-
al swab to evaluate the presence of SARS-CoV-2 
infection;
• to obtain within 24 hours the result of the oro-
pharyngeal swab. If the result of the swab is not 
available autopsy cannot be perfomed.
These precautions are necessary in order to preserve 
the safety of the health workers involved in the proce-
dure and the quality of the diagnosis, responding to 
the clinical question by focusing on the real reasons 
for which the postmortem examination was request-
ed. In addition, colleagues working in the Northern 
part of Italy in the areas with a greater spread of 
infection, who performed autopsy of patients with 
negative swab described histological changes 
consistent with those of lungs specimens ob-
tained from autopsy of positive patients (necrosis 
microfoci, thrombosis of small vessels, hyper-
plasia of second-order pneumocytes, polynucle-
ations and nuclear cytopathic alterations affecting 
endothelium and pneumocytes). 
Thus considering the current spread of the disease 
throughout the national territory, regardless of the 
hospital structure where the autopsy is carried out, 
but certainly in all those structures with a high num-
ber of positive COVID-19 inpatients, the execution of 
the diagnostic autopsy in any case must assume that 
the body is potentially infected and therefore take all 
appropriate precautionary measures as indicated in 
the section “Hygiene precautions in the manage-
ment of suspect, probable or confirmed case of 
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Figure 2. Diagnostic algorithm for patients dead hospitalized and with clinical and imaging evaluation.
V. Fineschi et al.12
COVID-19” so as to avoid any risk of contagion, not 
necessarily from SARS-CoV-2. Consequently, all the 
procedures indicated for sanitizing the anatomical ta-
ble and the sector environment must be followed after 
performing the autopsy.
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